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Spacecraft constellations seek to provide transformational services from increased environmental awareness to 
reduced-latency international finance. This connected future requires trusted communications. Transport-layer 
security models presume link characteristics and encapsulation techniques that may not be sustainable in a networked 
constellation. Emerging transport layer protocols for space communications enable new transport security protocols 
that may provide a pragmatic alternative to deploying Internet security mechanisms in space. The Bundle Protocol 
(BP) and Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec) protocol have been designed to provide such an alternative. 
BP is a store-and-forward alternative to IP that carries session information as secondary headers. BPSec uses BP’s 
featureful secondary header mechanism to hold security information and security results. In doing so, BPSec provides 
an in-packet augmentation alternative to security by encapsulation. BPSec enables features such as security-at-rest, 
separate encryption/signing of individual protocol headers, and the ability to add secondary headers and secure them 
at waypoints in the network. These features provided by BPSec change the system trades associated with networked 
constellations. They enable security at rest, secure content caching, and deeper inspection at gateways otherwise 
obscured by tunneling.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The promises of global communications include 
increased quality of life, better understanding and 
utilization of our planet, and more efficient industry. The 
pragmatic buildout of such a system should include 
space-based networking nodes, but must also consider 
existing infrastructure, spacecraft constraints, and a 
model for federating individual networks into a 
functioning internetwork1. 
Multiple actors within industry and government are 
constructing near-Earth communications constellations. 
Most constellations are envisioned as forming a 
dedicated backhaul interfacing with the terrestrial 
Internet (and third-party intranets) at ground stations. 
Regardless of design, a constellation’s success comes 
from its ability to provide trusted communications.  
Trusted communications are achieved by the integration 
of network architecture, topology, and multiple layers of 
security. However, security protocols in networked 
constellations will have to overcome multiple obstacles 
unique to the space environment in addition the usual set 
of security considerations. For example, security 
endpoints may be established between spacecraft in the 
constellation. In cases where two spacecraft are not in 
regular contact, this topological change can complicate 
network and transport layer endpoint-centric models of 
security services. The traditional space link approach of 
restricting security to only the link layer leads to other 
security issues. Packets may be rerouted in transit or may 
share links with other packets representing users from 
different administrative domains or with different trust 
models and credentials2.  
Like secured communications on the terrestrial Internet, 
an end-to-end security model at the transport layer 
reduces reliance on establishing a “chain of trust” across 
a data path. Terrestrial approaches to end-to-end 
transport security function well where spacecraft 
communications replicate the reliable, end-to-end links 
characteristic of the Internet. In cases where spacecraft 
cannot (or will not) support this connectivity model, 
these approaches may fail.  
Sometimes this failure stems from the links required to 
make a cryptographic algorithm function. For example, 
a stream cipher will not function across lossy paths. In 
other cases, the security protocol - the mechanism used 
to communicate cryptographic material - fails to carry 
information effectively. When security failures are 
caused by protocol issues, new security protocols can be 
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designed to better carry cryptographic material for more 
challenged or diverse environments.  
NASA, in coordination with other international space 
agencies, industry, and academia, has standardized the 
Bundle Protocol3 (BP) as an alternative to the Internet 
Protocol (IP) in cases where networks are challenged by 
significant signal propagation delays or frequent link 
disruptions. While these specific impairments may or 
may not be present in any given near-Earth constellation, 
the features and structure of BP “bundles” enable new 
techniques for data handling and data security. A 
security protocol built around the unique features of BP 
is the Bundle Protocol Security4 (BPSec) Protocol.  
BPSec provides end-to-end, store-and-forward-friendly 
security services with unique features such as data-at-
rest, different cipher suites for different portions of the 
BP bundle, and the ability to add security to a bundle at 
a waypoint without losing or hiding important semantic 
information.  
Specifically, BPSec enables an augmentation approach 
to network security. In such an approach, a bundle can 
carry network, transport, and application data with 
BPSec applying different cipher suites to each of these 
differently scoped information elements. By offering an 
alternative to security-through-encapsulation, BP and 
BPSec enable fewer constraints, and thus more 
flexibility, in the design of networked constellations.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II discusses both traditional and emerging 
approaches to constellation networking, transport, and 
security. Section III discusses the motivation for a new 
security protocol. Sections IV and V present the systems 
overview of BPSec and its implementation mechanics, 
respectively. Section VI describes the roles and 
responsibilities of BPSec network agents and Section 
VII provides examples of BPSec features operating in a 
network. Section VIII concludes the work with a 
summary of BPSec contributions. 
II. APPROACHES TO CONSTELLATION 
NETWORKING AND SECURITY  
Fully networked constellations are receiving renewed 
interest by government and industry. The most common 
approaches to building these constellations are to either 
reuse as much as possible from the terrestrial internet or 
to treat SATCOM links as a special tunnel connecting 
networks. Therefore, to review current approaches to 
securing networked constellations is to review the 
security of the terrestrial Internet and the security of 
dedicated SATCOM tunnels.  
This section discusses the networking assumptions upon 
which terrestrial Internet security is predicated, the 
unique constraints often present in space-based 
communications that may violate those assumptions, and 
emerging protocols that may be useful in addressing 
these gaps. 
Encapsulation and the TCP/IP Model 
As the most successful, scaled networking model in 
human history, the TCP/IP model used by the terrestrial 
Internet serves as a reasonable starting point for a 
networked constellation. The protocols and their 
behaviors are understood, and industry has already 
developed commercial tools for like systems. 
This networking model is characterized by a layered 
architecture with each layer responsible for different 
networking features. These logical “layers” are typically 
instantiated with an encapsulation approach; network 
information from one layer is “encapsulated” by network 
information from its lower layer just as it encapsulated 
information from its higher layer. This concept is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 - Layering is typically implemented using 
encapsulation5. 
For example, encapsulation is fundamental to the design 
of the protocols used to secure the internetwork and 
transport layers of the terrestrial Internet. Familiarity 
with these approaches, and their behavior, and 
limitations, is important to understanding the motivation 
for, and desired characteristics of, an alternative 
approach. 
Securing the Internetworking Layer 
The internetworking layer of the TCP/IP model6 routes 
packets across paths through either a single network or 
multiple, distinct network segments. The Internet 
Protocol (IP) that operates at this layer is secured with 
the Internet Protocol Security7 (IPSec) protocol.  
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IPSec uses separate mechanisms based on whether 
authentication or confidentiality is being applied to an IP 
packet. The Authentication Header8 (AH) provides 
authenticated data integrity over immutable parts of the 
packet whereas the Encapsulating Security Payload9 
(ESP) provides signed confidentiality to the IP payload 
by replacing its plain text contents with cipher text. The 
ESP and AH can be applied in either tunnel or transport 
mode, depending on how much packet data may be 
exposed to an external observer.  
As illustrated in Figure 2, tunnel mode treats the entire 
secured IP packet as the data of a new, encapsulating 
packet thus securing the entirety of the encapsulated 
packet. Transport mode preserves header portions of the 
IP packet. The specific way in which IPSec implements 
transport mode differs based on whether the packet is 
IPv4 or IPv6.  
 
Figure 2 - IPSec either augments or encapsulates 
packets based on mode and IP protocol version. 
The features and configuration of IPSec policy must be 
tuned to the network in which it is deployed. One such 
example of a secure architecture based on IPSec is the 
High Assurance Internet Protocol Interoperability 
Specification (HAIPIS) which defines how to combine 
multiple terrestrial Internet protocols to communicate 
highly sensitive data. High Assurance Internet Protocol 
Encryptor (HAIPE) devices conform to this specification 
and are required in circumstances requiring high levels 
of security10. HAIPE devices implement the IPSec 
protocol for network security but restrict certain 
capabilities and provide custom enhancements - such as 
pre-placed, symmetric keys. 
IPSec and HAIPE present both capabilities and 
challenges for networked constellations. By focusing on 
the networking layer, security can be agnostic of higher-
layer considerations at the transport layer. However, 
tunnel mode cannot address the situation where only a 
subset of an IP packet needs security and transport mode 
cannot address the situation where different parts of the 
packet need different types of security. As we discuss 
later, both situations can occur in a fully networked 
constellation.  
The use of IPSec headers, particularly in transport mode, 
demonstrates that headers can serve as an alternative to 
encapsulation for carrying security information. 
However, header semantics associated with IPv4 and 
IPv6 may not be featureful enough to support multiple 
types of security in a single packet.  
Securing the Transport Layer 
The transport layer of the TCP/IP model is responsible 
for reliable communication between messaging 
endpoints, to include in-order receipt, deduplication, and 
re-transmission. While IPSec is implemented between 
internetworking endpoints, transport security is used to 
secure information across multiple IPSec tunnels and to 
secure information after it has been taken out of an IP 
packet as part of delivery or re-encoding at the transport 
layer. Approaches to securing the transport layer differ 
based on whether the transport layer is connection-
oriented or connectionless. Connection-oriented 
transport uses TCP or QUIC for communication whereas 
connectionless transport uses UDP. 
Transport-Layer Security 1.311 (TLS) is the current 
implementation of security services for the TCP/IP 
transport layer. TLS is an umbrella term for a group of 
protocols requiring timely, ordered delivery for their 
proper operation. This includes protocols for session 
establishment, key negotiation, application data 
fragmentation, and record creation that are segmented 
into a ‘handshake layer” and an “application layer”.  
TLS requires a reliable transport layer for four reasons. 
(1) TLS records use implicit sequence numbers. If a TLS 
record is lost the wrong sequence number may be used 
to remove protection on that record. (2) TLS handshakes 
are dependent on precise ordering to succeed. (3) TLS 
handshakes omit some acknowledgements based on the 
assumption of receipt. (4) Handshake messages may be 
large enough to require fragmentation, the re-assembly 
of which requires reliable transport12.  
Connectionless transport mechanisms, such as UDP, do 
not retain information related to a sent message; the 
message is not explicitly acknowledged or re-
transmitted. The Datagram Transport Layer Security12 
(DTLS) protocol operates similarly to TLS with the 
exception that it has been modified for operation over a 
non-reliable transport. This is accomplished by adding 
explicit sequence numbers, retransmit timers, and 
devising special rules for handling segment 
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fragmentation. DTLS functions in cases where transport 
layers are unreliable. Its overall security design remains 
like TLS in that it seeks to establish synchronized 
information between two security endpoints.  
The QUIC13 protocol, originally developed by Google 
and currently being adopted by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force  (IETF), is a lighter-weight alternative to 
TCP for connection-oriented transport. QUIC reduces 
the number of handshake messages required for security 
negotiation and achieves reliability by federating 
multiple UDP streams that are managed by the QUIC 
layer itself. QUIC incorporates some aspects of the TLS 
handshake and can also integrate with TLS directly for 
security14. While QUIC provides a faster web loading 
experience, its connection approach suffers over satellite 
links15.  
Securing Traditional Spacecraft Communications 
There exists no single architecture for a space 
communications system because these systems exist for 
different purposes and are built by diversified sets of 
government agencies, commercial industry, and 
academia. Like the terrestrial Internet, space 
communications can be discussed in general terms by the 
standards used in their construction. The Consultative 
Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) is one such 
standards organization whose members comprise most 
of the world’s space agencies. Their standards enable 
interoperable commercial products and document 
common solutions to common problems.  
CCSDS protocols define both a Space Packet Protocol16 
(SPP) for path-based routing of a packet through a space 
network and an encapsulation service17 for tunneling IP 
(or similar) traffic through the space network. In either 
case, security for space systems is applied at some layer 
above the encapsulation service, built into a space-based 
data link layer, or both.  
The CCSDS protocol used to secure the data link layer 
is the Space Data Link Security (SDLS) Protocol. This 
approach treats space communications as a special 
tunnel between other parts of a secured network18. While 
this is a useful operating mode in cases where a network 
uses a spacecraft as a link, it does not scale in cases 
where the constellation, itself, is the network. 
The entry and exit points of a satellite communications 
system may be subject to link disruptions, low 
bandwidth, or both. To flow terrestrial Internet traffic, 
these systems deploy Performance Enhancing Proxies 
(PEPs) that “improve the performance of the Internet 
protocols on network paths where native performance 
suffers due to characteristics of a link or subnetwork on 
the path” 19.  
For example, when used at the transport layer, a TCP 
PEP may either generate additional local 
acknowledgements (or window acknowledgements) in 
an effort to provide better flow control. Alternatively, a 
TCP PEP can also provide TCP spoofing in which the 
PEP itself is the endpoint of the “local” TCP connection. 
Spoofing requires changing information in protocol 
headers and sending messages as if they came from other 
nodes - the exact types of behaviors that are usually 
protected against by security services.  
PEPs are often required infrastructure components, but 
can be expensive to deploy, require tuning and 
configuration, and present architectural problems related 
to how security can be maintained to and through PEP 
endpoints. 
A Networking Paradigm for Space and Ground 
Networks 
The Bundle Protocol (BP) version 6 (BPv6) was 
published in 2007 as an experimental20 approach to 
packetized internetworking for Delay-Tolerant 
Networks21. BPv6 was profiled by the CCSDS22 in 2015 
with version 7 (BPv7)3 being proposed for 
standardization in 2020 by the IETF.  
The BP data unit is called the “bundle” and represents a 
bundle of “blocks”. Each bundle contains a “primary 
block”, a “payload block”, and zero or more “extension 
blocks” that are like secondary headers. BP provides two 
motivating features in this context: a flexible protocol 
extension mechanism and standardized behavior for 
store-and-forward operations.  
Like IPv6 extension headers, BP extension blocks can be 
defined to carry additional information in a bundle. 
Unlike IPv6 extension headers, BP extension blocks can 
be re-ordered, can be of variable length, and can be 
added/processed/removed by any BP agent in the 
network, as illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 - BP provides a more featureful extension 
header mechanism than IPv65. 
BP extension blocks are expected to carry information 
with application, network, or node scope. For example, 
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the following types of information may be included in 
various extension blocks in a bundle.  
● Annotative information about the payload to 
expedite processing at waypoint nodes. 
● Control-channel information sent amongst 
nodes independent of any specific payload. 
● Session information when sessions cannot be 
maintained at endpoints. 
The motivation for providing a more featureful extension 
mechanism stems from BPs intended use as a store-and-
forward protocol for deep space networking. Deep-space 
links are characterized by long signal propagation delays 
and frequent disruptions. Networks operating in these 
conditions would need to store data for long periods of 
time and messages would need to carry information that 
would otherwise be assumed resident and synchronized 
at communication endpoints.  
 
Figure 4 - BP carries session information that 
cannot be synchronized end-to-end5. 
Because BP requires that its protocol agents store 
bundles, and because bundles can carry session 
information in extra headers, BP offers a viable 
alternative to PEPs for SATCOM23,24. For example, a 
spoofing PEP at the transport layer would not be 
necessary because the node running the spoofing proxy 
would already have the ability to store BP bundles in its 
role as a BP agent. BP improves communications 
performance when either physical or service interruption 
is experienced25, making it a compelling replacement for 
PEPs that would otherwise be used in a network to 
address these same service issues.  
III. MOTIVATION TO DEVELOP A NEW 
SECURITY PROTOCOL 
This section discusses the motivation for a new security 
protocol in the context of known issues when using (or 
combining) existing security protocols. This is not to say 
that the use of IPSec, HAIPE, TLS, DTLS, and PEPs is 
insecure, but that the use of these protocols necessitates 
either accepting significant inefficiencies or placing 
significant constraints on the network architecture.  
This section also discusses the conditions present in a 
networked constellation that would be considered 
stressing for existing security protocol designs, and what 
new features should be present in any security protocol 
proposed for use in these at-scale architectures.  
Issues with Existing Security Protocols 
There are four concerns related to the deployment of 
security protocols that may be impactful to networked 
constellation architectures: coarse-grained packet 
security, super-encapsulation, delay intolerance, and 
reliance on synchronized data. 
Coarse-Grained Packet Security. Existing security 
approaches are often all-or-nothing with respect to 
confidentiality. For example, tunnel modes encrypt 
entire packets whereas transport modes encrypt entire 
payloads, but not header information (IPv4) or some 
header information (IPv6). This is consistent with a strict 
layered approach to security but is unable to support 
architectures where the responsibilities between layers 
are not so clear. For example, if an encrypting “network 
layer” security tunnel is defined between two endpoints, 
then a node within that tunnel would be unable to see any 
transport layer information, even if a certain subset of 
that information would be useful. 
Such non-standard functionality would be useful and 
secure in a networked constellation if messages mixed 
network, transport, and application layer information. 
For example, an unmodified TCP/IP stack is unable to 
use IPSec through TCP PEPs and blending these layers 
of information together usefully requires additional 
architectural components, non-standard protocol 
modifications, and new algorithms29.  
Super-Encapsulation. One approach to avoiding the 
information-hiding problem caused by encapsulation is 
to use more encapsulation. For example, if TCP headers 
are encrypted by IPSec or HAIPE, then the entire packet 
can be placed as the payload of another TCP segment for 
reliability to and through the security tunnel. In this way, 
important plain text information can be preserved in the 
encapsulating TCP segment rather than hidden in the 
encapsulated, encrypted TCP segment26.  
This approach incurs the obvious inefficiencies of 
repeated headers and header information. Further, it 
presupposes that the encapsulating packets can be 
populated with appropriate header values from the 
encrypted, encapsulated packets. Finally, these 
approaches must take special care to avoid problems 
with nested protocol control loops, such as the TCP 
meltdown problem27,28. In this situation, conflicts 
between timers and acknowledgements of the 
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encapsulating TCP segment cause problems with the 
retransmission of the encapsulated TCP segment.   
Delay-Intolerance. Most of the terrestrial Internet exists 
within ready access to capable infrastructure providing 
timely and reliable communications and reducing the 
impact of transport-layer retransmissions. In cases where 
end-to-end communications are delayed as a function of 
capacity and congestion, pre-placed information can 
load balance information for geographic distribution.  
Networked constellations may not have ready access to 
such infrastructure, and rapidly moving, sparsely 
populated constellations may not be able to effectively 
pre-place information. In such situations, protocols must 
be able to handle delays and disruptions as part of the 
normal operation of the network, rather than as some 
transient error condition that must be “waited out”.  
Reliance on Synchronized Data. Security protocols such 
as TLS and IPSec rely on the establishment of security 
sessions prior to the secure exchange of information. 
This session establishment implies that the endpoints of 
the secure tunnel allocate and maintain session state. If 
session information times-out or is changed (such as 
when rotating keys), or if messages are lost or received 
out of order, then the secure tunnel may no longer be 
usable. Protocols such as DTLS require less session 
information but preserve some concepts as part of TLS 
compatibility. 
Networked Constellation Stressing Conditions 
Security tunnels in resourced networks can be 
established in milliseconds and if a tunnel collapses, it 
can be re-established just as quickly. Networks 
challenged by delays and disruptions may not be able to 
establish tunnels as quickly and must architect the 
network to avoid needless renegotiation of security 
tunnels.  
For example, a common “passthrough” spacecraft 
architecture involves using end-to-end transport, IPSec 
or HAIPE encryption, and super-encapsulation through 
PEPs to handle individual delays. Architectures such as 
the one illustrated in Figure 5 are built from necessity, 
not efficiency. Depending on the way in which security 
is passed through the PEPs, and how much super-
encapsulation is used, the system may also be brittle to 
change and significantly reduce data throughput. This 
architecture also does not represent a networked 
constellation which would need to establish transport 
and network security services that may both originate 
and terminate within the constellation itself. 
There is no single definition of a networked constellation 
architecture. Architectural concepts span the spectrum 
from linear pass-through systems to hub-and-spoke 
models to opportunistic mesh networks. When reasoning 
about the potential stressing conditions encountered by 
spacecraft in such a constellation, the most complex 
formulation must be considered; if a security solution 
can operate in the most stressing environment then it 
would presumably operate in less stressing 
environments.  
 
Figure 5 - Existing security mechanisms lock 
networks to a specific model. 
There are five stressing conditions present in an 
opportunistically meshed constellation. Such an 
architecture is characterized by ad-hoc contacts and ill-
structured data paths. Specifically, these conditions are 
intermittent connectivity, congested paths, partitioned 
topologies, limited link state information, and multiple 
administrative controls. 
Intermittent connectivity. Inter-spacecraft links, like any 
wireless link, may be attenuated, unidirectional, 
occulated, or otherwise disrupted. These disruptions may 
be foreseeable, planned on short notice, or occur 
randomly as a function of the external environment. In 
opportunistic networks nodes may join and leave the 
network without prior planning which also affects 
connectivity. 
Unless specifically designed to support constant, high-
rate communications and unless operating under 
nominal conditions, a networked constellation will likely 
encounter disruptions leading to data delivery delays. 
This is the case with even space-based pass-through 
links, and why PEPs are often deployed as part of a 
SATCOM solution. 
Congested Paths. While there are significant 
advancements in the bandwidth achievable through 
inter-satellite links, networked constellations of any size 
and data capacity will likely still see congestion across 
data paths. For example, optical inter-satellite links can 
support speeds of at least 10Gbps30 representing at least 
an order-of-magnitude increase in inter-satellite 
bandwidth. However, the sufficiency of the path can only 
be evaluated relative to the data in the network. For 
example, ultra-high definition cameras can output 
12Gbps31 streams and 8K cameras can output 16Gbps 
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streams. Notwithstanding protocol overhead, a single 
camera can saturate an optical link and, thus, any path 
needing to use that link. Data volumes and data rates 
depend on how the constellation is used, but it is unlikely 
that such links would avoid congestion. 
Partitioned Topologies. The source and destination of 
messages within the networked constellation may never 
have a path connecting them at any one instant in time. 
These nodes may exist in different network partitions or, 
in an ad-hoc network, may leave the network entirely 
during some part of the message exchange. This 
partitioning may persist for extended periods of time 
such that it is the rule not the exception. Approaches that 
assume timely connectivity between messaging 
endpoints may not function in an opportunistic mesh 
network.  
Limited Link State Information. Intermittent 
connectivity, congested links, partitioned topologies, 
and asymmetric data rates complicate the measurement 
and exchange of link state. Because the magnitude of 
link state data grows with the number of links, measuring 
aggregate link state across an evolving networked 
constellation requires a high volume of information 
exchange which, itself, can be limited by congested 
links.  
Multiple Administrative Controls. The spacecraft 
comprising a networked constellation may be owned, 
administered, and operated by a single organization. 
Alternatively, the network may be built from a federation 
of spacecraft representing multiple organizations with 
diverse ownership, operational concepts, and 
administrative policies and configurations.  
Administrative domains may be enforced as part of the 
hierarchy of a federated network. For example, a 
message generated in a “source segment” of a network 
may have one set of policy applied to it, and then other 
policies as it traverses other “transport” segments of the 
network, and possibly other sets of policy once received 
at the destination segment of the network. Such a 
circumstance is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 - Federated networks cross administrative 
domains5. 
Desirable Properties of a Security Protocol 
An ideal security protocol is one which provides needed 
security services while placing the fewest constraints on 
the architecture of the network it is securing. In 
particular, network constellations may not behave the 
same as terrestrial networks.  
There are five properties that make a security protocol 
more adaptable to the stressing conditions of a 
networked constellation without otherwise constraining 
the architecture of that constellation. These properties 
are fine-grained security, augmentation before 
encapsulation, delay tolerance, topology independence, 
and self-sufficiency.  
Fine-Grained Packet Security (FGPS). Not all 
information in a data packet needs to be secured in the 
same way. For example, in both IPv6 and BP, secondary 
headers can be used to carry a variety of annotative 
information describing characteristics of the link, the 
payload, the path, the prior hop, quality of service, and 
other information. While some of this information may, 
itself, need security, it may not need the same security as 
the payload. A flexible security protocol is needed which 
allows for different kinds of information in a packet to 
be secured differently.  
Augmentation Before Encapsulation (ABE). Fine-
grained security cannot be achieved with encapsulation, 
which, by definition, hides encapsulated data. An 
augmentation approach allows for the creation of 
headers in a packet for the purpose of carrying security 
information. The potential efficiency of augmentation 
over super encapsulation is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 - Protocol augmentation provides an 
alternative to encapsulation for security services. 
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Delay-Tolerance (DT). A desirable security protocol 
would be one which can tolerate delivery delays and link 
disruptions – particularly as it pertains to the 
establishment of initial cryptographic material and the 
maintenance of session state. 
Topological Independence (TI). Not every networked 
constellation will maintain a fixed topology. While 
changes to waypoint nodes in a network might be opaque 
to the processing of IPSec and TLS, changes to the end 
points of a secure tunnel can break the tunnel when new 
endpoints have not synchronized on the same session 
state.  
Existing security protocols achieve their topological 
independence by re-purposing protocol data fields in 
non-standard ways. For example, security tunnel 
endpoints could be specified as local loopback addresses 
and a separate mechanism could be deployed to “re-
route” tunnels to new endpoints. 
A desirable security protocol would allow for dynamic 
tunnel endpoints without requiring additional layers of 
redirection. Such a common problem should be handled 
in a common way.  
Self-Sufficiency (SS). As a function of communication 
limitations, topological change, node resources, or data 
volume there may be times when endpoints in a network 
cannot maintain required session state. A desirable 
security protocol would support carrying necessary 
information within the secured packet itself.  
Table 1: Desirable security properties address 
stressing conditions in networked constellations. 
 FGPS ABE DT TI SS 
Intermittent Connectivity   X  X 
Congested Paths X X    
Partitioned Topologies  X  X  
Limited Link State   X X  
Multiple Administrative 
Controls 
X    X 
As illustrated in Table 1, these desirable properties 
address the stressing conditions of networked 
constellations. Fine-grained packet security and 
augmentation reduce message size and better support 
multiple administrative domains and changing network 
topologies. Delay-tolerance means that loss of link 
connectivity and lack of knowledge of link state will not 
prevent eventual secure message delivery. Topological 
independence does not hard-code security endpoints 
allowing them to change as link state and topologies 
change. Finally, self-sufficiency does not require state to 
be held at endpoints, which may exist in different 
administrative domains or be inaccessible due to loss of 
connectivity. 
IV. BPSEC: A NOVEL APPROACH TO 
TRANSPORT-LAYER SECURITY 
The predilection for layer-based security and super 
encapsulation is understandably driven by the existence 
of standards, standards-based products, and their 
successful deployments in other networking use cases. 
To the extent that traditional security approaches cannot 
address the needs of emerging networked constellations, 
a new approach should be investigated. 
The BP represents a novel transport protocol with an 
expressive header syntax. Unlike IPv6 extension 
headers, multiple extension blocks of the same type can 
exist (enumerated by an instance ID), block ordering is 
not mandated, and waypoint nodes can insert blocks as 
necessary. This allows extension blocks to act as 
“secondary payloads” that can be secured individually.  
Such a novel approach to security at the transport layer 
is a fusion of concepts present in traditional security 
approaches. 
● Like IPv6, extension headers can hold security 
information, and be the targets of security 
services such as authentication and 
confidentiality. 
● Like IPSec, authentication and confidentiality 
can be applied separately based on need.  
● Like QUIC and DTLS, information can be 
bundled to reduce the round-trip handshakes 
necessary for negotiation. 
● Like TLS, data can be segmented - using BP 
extension blocks instead of TLS records. 
The concepts incorporated by BPSec, as inspired by 
useful properties of other security protocols, are listed in 
Table 2. 




IPv6 TCP QUIC IPSec TLS DTLS 
Security in headers    X X X 
Nodes add headers X      
Data bundled to 
reduce round-trips 
  X   X 
Segment secured 
data 
 X  X X X 
Apply different 
cipher suites 
   X X X 
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Key Negotiation and Management 
Key negotiation and management enable security 
mechanisms based on shared secrets. Unlike IPSec and 
TLS, BPSec does not mandate a specific mechanism for 
the generation of shared secrets and session keys or for 
managing longer-lived security keys. If security nodes 
can generate keys, those keys can be used with BPSec 
and the protocol is not otherwise limited.  
In environments where terrestrial Internet Key Exchange 
(IKE) can occur, BPSec allows this formulation. BPSec 
also supports environments requiring symmetric, 
preconfigured keys or other out-of-band mechanisms.  
Early Attempts to Secure the Bundle Protocol 
The concept of extension blocks used to implement BP 
security features was first proposed in the experimental 
Bundle Security Protocol32 (BSP). The BSP defined 
“security blocks” to carry cryptographic material 
associated with authentication, integrity, or 
confidentiality of other bundle blocks. These blocks 
were like the authentication header (AH) and 
encapsulating security payload (ESP) of IPSec in IPv6. 
This experimental work was refined as the Streamlined 
Bundle Security Protocol33 (SBSP) defined by the 
CCSDS for securing BPv6.  BPSec is the security 
protocol for BPv7 and beyond.  
BPSec Design Principles 
The design of BPSec was guided by the principles of 
block-level granularity, multiple security sources, mixed 
security policy, user-selectable security contexts, and 
deterministic processing. Adherence to these principles 
ensures that BPSec meets the desirable properties of a 
networked constellation security protocol.  
Block-Level Granularity (BLG). By definition, a bundle 
is a collection of blocks. This means that any security 
service present in the bundle must be captured in a block 
and the target of that security service must, itself, be 
captured in one or more blocks.  This “block-level” 
granularity allows BPSec operations to be targeted to 
different types of information in the bundle. For instance, 
as illustrated in Figure 8, confidentiality may be applied 
to one block while a signed integrity mechanism may 
separately be applied to some other block. 
 
Figure 8 - Blocks in a bundle carry security 
information for other blocks in the bundle. 
Multiple Security Sources (MSS). BPSec allows multiple 
nodes to augment the bundle with new security blocks. 
This allows different network segments to add security 
on blocks within the bundle while keeping other blocks 
within the bundle unmodified. Any node which adds a 
security block to a bundle is the “security source” for that 
block. Importantly, adding a new security service into a 
bundle does not require altering other information in the 
bundle not related to the security service.  
Supporting multiple security sources also means 
supporting multiple security endpoints. BPSec assigns 
security-related processing functions to nodes as a matter 
of the policy configuration of the nodes themselves. 
Security services provided by the BPSec do not require 
“anchoring” at specific nodes in a network.  
Mixed Security Policy (MSP). BPSec policy allows 
nodes to assert their role in the creation, verification, and 
acceptance of security services in the bundle. This is like 
IPSec and TLS services where nodes are configured to 
serve as tunnel endpoints. However, the BPSec approach 
allows these roles to change even after security has been 
applied to the bundle without requiring out-of-band 
address translation schemes such as terminating security 
tunnels at loopback addresses. 
User-Selectable Security Contexts (USSC). Unlike IPSec 
which requires a security association between two 
endpoints, and unlike TLS which requires a 
synchronized session, BPSec can operate in 
environments where there is no negotiated information 
between a security source and a security endpoint. This 
behavior is required given the environments in which BP 
may be deployed. 
To address this scenario, BPSec introduces the concept 
of a “security context” as the union of security policy, 
cipher suite configuration, and session parameters 
necessary to implement a security service. Security 
contexts can be populated based on the needs of the 
networking environment.  
Security contexts may contain all information needed to 
process the security operations in the bundle (fully 
asynchronous mode), they may only include necessary 
information to identify security associations (fully 
synchronous mode), or they may carry default or other 
synchronizing information (hybrid mode).  
Deterministic Processing (DP). The benefit of super 
encapsulation is that the processing order of security 
services in a packet is always clear. For example, if a 
packet is encapsulated in another packet, the 
encapsulating packet must be deciphered prior to 
addressing security for the encapsulated packet. 
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When choosing to augment packets, processing order is 
no longer encoded in the encapsulation hierarchy. This 
may cause problems in understanding the order in which 
security blocks should be processed. The BPSec defines 
processing rules and restrictions to prevent block 
processing ambiguities; the processing order for BPSec 
security blocks is deterministic.  
Mapping BPSec Principles to Desirable Properties 
The mapping of BPSec design principles to network 
constellation desirable properties is given in Table 3.  
Securing individual blocks using multiple security 
sources provides fine-grained security without 
mandating an encapsulation approach and without 
incurring the challenges of that approach in a dynamic 
topology. Flexible security policies and security contexts 
provide standardized mechanisms for adapting to 
delivery delays and changes to the network topology. 
Security-by-augmentation could not occur without a 
deterministic processing order. 
Table 3: BPSec design properties satisfy the 
desirable properties of a security protocol. 
  BLG MSS MSP USSC DP 
Fine-Grained 
Security 
X X X   
Augmentation 
before encapsulation 
X X   X 
Delay-tolerance   X X  
Topological 
independence 
X X X X  
Self-sufficiency    X X 
 
V.  BUNDLE PROTOCOL SECURITY 
MECHANICS 
BPSec provides two security services for blocks within 
a bundle: plain text integrity and signed confidentiality. 
A BPSec security operation is defined as the application 
of a security service to a specific target block within the 
bundle. The physical representation of a security 
operation in a bundle is a BP extension block called a 
security block. The security block used to apply plain 
text integrity is called the Block Integrity Block (BIB) 
and the security block used to apply signed 
confidentiality is called the Block Confidentiality Block 
(BCB).  
The Block Integrity Block (BIB) 
Similar to an IPSec AH, a BIB carries the output of an 
integrity mechanism as one or more security results. The 
BIB is calculated by feeding the contents of its target 
block to a selected integrity mechanism and storing 
important parameters, optional session information, and 
the results of the integrity mechanism.  
The BIB may carry information for one or more security 
targets in cases where the integrity mechanism uses 
shared parameters as applied by the same node in the 
network. In this case, multiple sets of security results are 
captured in the block, one for each security target.  
While conceptually like the AH, BIBs may pick and 
choose which blocks in the bundle they apply to, and 
integrity can be preserved if the ordering of blocks in the 
bundle changes.  
The Block Confidentiality Block (BCB) 
Similar to the IPSec ESP, a BCB carries cryptographic 
material relating to the cipher suite used to encrypt the 
contents of some other block or blocks in a bundle.  The 
BPSec requires the use of Authenticated Encryption with 
Additional Data (AEAD) cipher suites to generate signed 
cipher text and other authenticated but unencrypted data.  
When a BCB is added to a bundle its target blocks are 
encrypted in place. When the BCB is removed from the 
bundle, the target blocks are decrypted.  
The BCB carries plain text parameters, encrypted 
parameters, and optional session information associated 
with the cipher suite. The BCB may also carry additional 
signatures and overflow cipher text (in cases when 
produced cipher text is larger than the original plain text 
of the target block) or this information may be merged 
with the cipher text itself and stored in the target block 
in cases where the target block is allowed to increase in 
size. 
VI. BPSEC ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Security policy at the node determines the role the node 
will play for any given security block in the bundle. For 
example, a single node may add a new security block, 
verify the integrity of another security block, and 
accept/remove a third security block within the same 
bundle.  
Security sources add security blocks when necessary to 
implement security operations as required by node 
policy. As illustrated in Figure 9, a node acting as a 
security source accepts a bundle from the local Bundle 
Processing Agent (BPA) which contains at least one 
target block requiring the application of a security 
service. The security source adds a security block for the 
appropriate target block prior to forwarding the bundle. 
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Figure 9 - Security Sources add security blocks to 
bundles as required by node policy. 
Security verifiers check that the contents of an existing 
security block are consistent with the conditions that 
were present when the security block was created. In the 
case of integrity, security results can be re-calculated and 
compared to those in the security block. In the case of 
confidentiality, any associated plain text authenticated 
data may be verified in a similar process. Security 
verifiers do not decrypt data. 
As illustrated in Figure 10, a node acting as a security 
verifier accepts a bundle with one or more security 
operations represented in it and, as a matter of node 
policy, verifies some subset of security blocks. If a 
verifier cannot verify the integrity of a security block, the 
block may be removed from the bundle, the target block 
may be removed from the bundle, or the bundle may be 
removed from the network.  
 
Figure 10 - Security verifiers ensure that data has 
not been changed in transit. 
Security acceptors both verify the security operation in 
the bundle and process/remove the security block from 
the bundle, as illustrated in Figure 11. In the case of 
integrity, the security acceptor operates in the same way 
as a security verifier, with the addition that the security 
block is then removed from the bundle. In the case of 
confidentiality, the appropriate cipher suite is given the 
cipher text body of the target block as well as other 
parameters from the security context. The calculated 
plain text returned from the cipher suite replaces the 
cipher text contents of the target block and the security 
block is removed from the bundle.   
 
Figure 11 - Security acceptors are the endpoints of a 
security operation in a bundle. 
Like other security protocols, bundles with security 
blocks may pass through nodes that are not otherwise 
security aware. The relationship of bundles with security 
blocks through BPSec aware and BPSec unaware nodes 
is illustrated in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12 - Bundle Transmission by BPAs with 
Various Roles 
In this figure BP nodes BN1, BN3, and BN4 are BPSec 
aware while BN2 cannot process security blocks. 
Consider the role of these four nodes with respect to 
three different bundles. BN1 is a security source for 
bundles 1 and 2. BN3 is the bundle destination and, thus, 
security acceptor for bundle 1, a security verifier for 
bundle 2, and a security source for bundle 3. BN4 is the 
acceptor for bundles 2 and 3.  
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VII. BPSEC EXAMPLES 
This section discusses the use of the BPSec 
augmentation approach to achieve common security 
protocol functions that would normally be spread across 
application, transport, and network layers using various 
encapsulation schemes. The four examples presented are 
single-source confidentiality, multiple-source 
confidentiality, data at rest, and secure content 
aggregation.  
Single-Source Confidentiality 
Single-source confidentiality illustrates the familiar 
concept of an encrypted  security tunnel between two 
endpoints, such as could be implemented with either 
IPSec or TLS. Similar to IPSec, this tunnel in BP could 
be instantiated as part of the networking layer covering 
all bundles traversing a portion of the network. Like 
TLS, the tunnel could be applied only to bundles with 
certain destinations or only to certain blocks in the 
bundle, providing finer-grained discernment of how 
traffic is encrypted as a function of the applications that 
generate it.  
Multiple-Source Confidentiality 
A bundle may travel through different network segments 
enforcing different security policies. BPSec treats these 
security policy gateways as security sources and not new 
encapsulation points for a new security tunnel.  
Consider the scenario where a bundle is created with an 
integrity signature on its primary block. Later, at a 
gateway node, the payload of the bundle is encrypted. At 
some point after the payload encryption, but before 
eventual payload decryption, a new extension block is 
added to the bundle and also encrypted. This case is 
illustrated in Figure 13 and represents a stressing case for 
encapsulation because the “security tunnels” have 
overlapping endpoints. However, this situation can exist 
in a networked constellation attempting to adhere to the 
desirable security properties of topological 
independence, self-sufficiency, and delay-tolerance.  
In this illustration, the scope of the various security 
tunnels are illustrated over a set of 6 nodes (1-6) 
comprising the path traversed by the bundle. A stacked 
representation of transmitted bundle blocks is shown 
between each node in the diagram. Dashed arrows are 
drawn from a BPSec security block to its target block. 
At the bundle source (1) a BIB is added to the bundle 
holding an integrity security result over the primary 
block. Policy at the next node (2) requires that payloads 
be encrypted and so a BCB is added which carries 
appropriate parameters and replaces the contents of the 
payload with cipher text. At node 3, separate policy adds 
a new extension block to carry additional, encrypted data 
associated with the data exchange (e.g., a metadata 
annotation such as a GPS tag34). Node 4 ends the payload 
security tunnel, and the BCB associated with the payload 
is removed and the payload is decrypted in place.  Node 
5 processes and removes the added extension block, 
leaving the bundle to arrive at node 6 in the same 
condition that it left node 1. 
 
Figure 13 - BPSec provides security via 
augmentation as well as via encapsulation. 
In this example, BPSec provides security operations that 
target network layer concerns (routing information), 
transport layer concerns, and application layer concerns 
while also tolerating changes to node policy.  
Security for Data at Rest 
As a store-and-forward protocol, bundles may be 
persisted at nodes for extended periods of time. Because 
BPSec carries security information as blocks within the 
bundle, when the bundle is stored the security associated 
with that bundle is also stored. Encrypted data is never 
decrypted during transmission until the bundle has 
arrived at its security acceptor. 
This is different from current approaches to network and 
transport security where the security is associated with 
the transmission of data. Security protocols are not self-
sufficient if they require session information to be 
present at endpoints. The BPSec concept of security 
context provides additional information in the security 
blocks themselves to avoid this occurrence, and those 
security blocks are also persisted with the bundle. 
Secure Content Aggregation 
Content caches allow data to be pre-placed where it can 
be readily accessed. Content aggregators are used 
frequently on the terrestrial Internet to distribute traffic 
load across geographic areas. Similarly, sparse networks 
utilize content caches to reduce data return times, 
especially in cases where re-transmitting data incurs 
significant node resources and delays35. 
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BP agents must persistently store bundles as part of 
supporting store-and-forward networking. Because 
BPSec provides security at rest, the bundle store can be 
used as a local, secure content cache where the payloads 
of bundles can be encrypted with BCBs. Extension 
blocks holding annotative information on these payloads 
can be added to assist with the organization and retrieval 
of information in this caching scheme.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Existing security solutions at both the networking and 
transport layer make assumptions on the nature of the 
networks they secure. These assumptions include stable 
topologies and rapid renegotiation or convergence after 
times of change. These features are rarely present in even 
the simplest SATCOM architectures. Attempts to apply 
security to these SATCOM architectures limit the 
practical system engineering trades associated with these 
constellations.  
A common approach to dealing with different roles and 
responsibilities in securing a network is encapsulation. 
Nested encapsulation, or super encapsulation, constrains 
the performance of a network by adding processing and 
data overhead. It also constrains the design of the 
network to have fixed endpoints for the encapsulation 
and subsequent decapsulation. Forcing networked 
constellation architectures to reuse terrestrial security 
protocols may limit the functionality of the 
constellations themselves.  
An alternative to super encapsulation is packet 
augmentation, wherein security services are flattened in 
a packet such that security boundaries can be enforced 
where needed without hiding otherwise unaffected data. 
However, this approach requires a more featureful 
secondary header mechanism than provided by either 
TCP or IP.  
The BP, originally designed for use in deep space 
missions, provides a more expressive extension 
mechanism. BPSec uses this mechanism to provide a 
flexible augmentation approach to security. While 
BPSec can work in an encapsulation scheme, it also can 
provide security features without incurring the 
inefficiencies or architectural constraints imposed by 
those approaches.   
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